Person:

Alfaro, Laura

In 1996, Intel Corporation announced the construction of a semiconductor assembly plant in Costa Rica. Production started in 1998. Intel’s investment was six times what had been the annual foreign direct investment (FDI) in this Central American country of 3.5 million people (see Spar, 1998) and it marked the expansion of FDI in electronics, medical devices, and business services by companies such as Boston Scientific, Hewlett Packard, IBM, and Procter & Gamble. But Intel’s investment in Costa Rica was also emblematic of the desire of Central American countries to move away from textile and clothing manufacturing into higher-end manufacturing and services, in hopes of boosting development efforts by promoting technology upgrades, knowledge spillovers, and linkages of foreign with domestic firms. In 2014, the company announced the restructuring of the facilities. Intel’s Global Services Center as well as the company’s Engineering and Design Center will remain in their current location in Costa Rica. These operations will gain relevance in Research & Development related activities. As part of its global strategy, the company will relocate its assembly and test operation to Asia, where these activities will be concentrated. Headcount for R&D services operations currently reaches 1200 people and new positions were recently been announced.

In aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008–2009, emerging-market governments have increasingly restricted foreign capital inflows. The data show a statistically significant drop in cumulative abnormal returns for Brazilian firms following capital control announcements. Large firms and the largest exporting firms appear less negatively affected compared to external-finance- dependent firms, and capital controls on equity have a more negative announcement effect than those on debt. Real investment falls following the controls. Overall, the results suggest that capital controls segment international financial markets, increase the cost of capital, reduce the availability of external finance, and lower firm-level investment.

Recent rulings in the ongoing litigation over the pari passu clause in Argentinian sovereign debt instruments have generated considerable controversy. Some official-sector participants and academic articles have suggested that the rulings will disrupt or impede future sovereign debt restructurings by encouraging holdout creditors to litigate for full payment instead of participating in negotiated exchange offers. This paper critically examines this claim and argues that the incentives for holdout litigation are limited because of (1) significant constraints on creditor litigation, (2) substantial economic and reputational costs associated with such litigation, and (3) the availability of contractual provisions and negotiating strategies that mitigate the debtor's collective action problems. It also argues that the fact-specific equitable remedy in the Argentina case was narrowly tailored to Argentina's unprecedented disregard for court opinions and for international norms of negotiating sovereign debt restructurings and is therefore unlikely to be used in future debt restructurings.

This paper examines the impact of the deregulation of compulsory industrial licensing in India on firm size dynamics and reallocation of resources within industries. Following deregulation, resource misallocation declines, and the left-hand tail of the firm size distribution thickens significantly, suggesting increased entry by small firms. However, the dominance and growth of large incumbents remains unchallenged. Quantile regressions reveal that the distributional effects of deregulation on firm size are significantly non-linear. The reallocation of market shares toward a small number of large firms and a large number of small firms is characterized as the "shrinking middle" in Indian manufacturing. Small- and medium-sized firms may continue to face constraints in their attempts to grow.

This paper documents a set of stylized facts about leverage and financial fragility in the nonfinancial corporate sector in emerging markets since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). Corporate debt vulnerability indicators prior to the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) attributed to corporate financial roots provide a benchmark for comparison. The firm-level data suggest that emerging markets post-GFC have lower leverage ratios than the five Asian crisis countries (Asian Five) in the run-up to the AFC. However, a broader set of emerging market countries show weaker liquidity, solvency, and profitability indicators. More countries are also in the Altman Z-score's “grey zone”, that is, at risk for corporate distress. Regression estimates confirm that leading up to the AFC and in the aftermath of the GFC, firms with higher leverage have Z-scores that are closer to the financial distress range. The data also corroborate two macro-related hypotheses: first, that leverage interacted with currency depreciation had a statistically significant adverse impact on Z-scores in pre-AFC; and second, that in countries with higher GDP growth leverage is correlated with less corporate financial fragility. Consistent with Gabaix (2011) the paper finds a granularity effect in that large firms are systemically important—idiosyncratic shocks to large firms significantly correlate with GDP growth in our emerging markets sample. Also, the more-levered large firms are more vulnerable to exchange rate shocks than smaller firms with comparable levels of leverage. While this result holds for the average country in our sample, there is substantial cross-country heterogeneity.

We construct measures of net private and public capital flows for a large cross-section of developing countries considering both creditor and debtor side of the international debt transactions. Using these measures, we demonstrate that sovereign-to-sovereign transactions account for upstream capital flows and global imbalances. Specifically, we find (1) international net private capital flows (inflows minus outflows of private capital) are positively correlated with countries' productivity growth; (2) net sovereign debt flows (government borrowing minus reserves) are negatively correlated with growth only if net public debt is financed by another sovereign; (3) net public debt financed by private creditors is positively correlated with growth; and (4) public savings are strongly positively correlated with growth, whereas the correlation between private savings and growth is flat and statistically insignificant. These empirical facts contradict the conventional wisdom and constitute a challenge for the existing theories on upstream capital flows and global imbalances.

The explosion of multinational activities in recent decades is rapidly transforming the global landscape of industrial production. But are the emerging clusters of multinational production the rule or the exception? What drives the offshore agglomeration of multinational firms in comparison to the agglomeration of domestic firms? Using a unique worldwide plant-level dataset that reports detailed location, ownership, and operation information for plants in over 100 countries, we construct a spatially continuous index of pairwise-industry agglomeration and investigate the patterns and determinants underlying the global economic geography of multinational firms. Our analysis presents new stylized facts that suggest the emerging offshore clusters of multinationals are not a simple reflection of domestic industrial clusters. Agglomeration economies including capital-good market externality and technology diffusion play a more important role in the offshore agglomeration of multinationals than the agglomeration of domestic firms. These findings remain robust when we address potential reverse causality by exploring the regional pattern and process of agglomeration.

We examine the differential response of establishments to the recent global financial crisis with particular emphasis on the role of foreign ownership. Using a worldwide establishment panel dataset, we investigate how multinational subsidiaries around the world responded to the crisis relative to local establishments. We find that first, multinational subsidiaries fared on average better than local counterfactuals with similar economic characteristics. Second, among multinational subsidiaries, establishments sharing stronger vertical production and financial linkages with parents exhibited greater resilience. Finally, in contrast to the crisis period, the effect of foreign ownership and linkages on establishment performance was insignificant in non-crisis years.

Multinationals exhibit distinct agglomeration patterns which have transformed the global landscape of industrial production (Alfaro and Chen, 2014). Using a unique worldwide plant-level dataset that reports detailed location, ownership, and operation information for plants in over 100 countries, we construct a spatially continuous index of pairwise-industry agglomeration and investigate the patterns and determinants underlying the global economic geography of multinational firms. In particular, we run a horse-race between two distinct economic forces: location fundamentals and agglomeration economies. We find that location fundamentals including market access and comparative advantage and agglomeration economies including capital-good market externality and technology diffusion play a particularly important role in multinationals' economic geography. These findings remain robust when we use alternative measures of trade costs, address potential reverse causality, and explore regional patterns.

Social preferences facilitate the internalization of health externalities, for example, by reducing mobility during a pandemic. We test this hypothesis using mobility data from 258 cities worldwide alongside experimentally validated measures of social preferences. Controlling for time-varying heterogeneity that could arise at the level at which mitigation policies are implemented, we find that they matter less in regions that are more altruistic, patient, or exhibit less negative reciprocity. In those regions, mobility falls ahead of lockdowns, and remains low after the lifting thereof. Our results elucidate the importance, independent of the cultural context, of social preferences in fostering cooperative behavior.