HKS Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs

These words describe the extraordinary changes happening in the Arctic region. The Arctic of today does not resemble the Arctic of fifty years ago, and the Arctic of 2070 will be different still, based on everything we know now. Warmer temperatures on land and in the ocean, retreating sea ice and glaciers, thawing permafrost, rapidly changing ecosystems, range expansion of novel species and stress in native species, changing ocean chemistry, and altered seasons all contribute to significant alteration of a region in an extremely compressed timescale. At the same time, globalization and the increasing international interest in the region add new pressures for access, development and geopolitical positioning in the Arctic. Concerns about the implications and impacts of that intensified engagement generate even more anxiety about the transformation to a brand-new Arctic in the 21st Century.

These changes are undeniable, and they are accelerating, as has been well documented by numerous studies, scientific papers, Indigenous Knowledge and by personal accounts from the people of the Arctic describing the changes they are witnessing and how their lives have been impacted. All these sources agree that the change and the impacts are unprecedented and threaten the health and safety of communities now and in the future. Has this documentation changed the way in which decisions are being made to prepare for the future? In my opinion, only to a very limited extent.

The Arctic is warming three to four times faster than the rest of the globe. Various feedback mechanisms are accelerating climate change in the High North, yet uncertainties about these processes hinder our ability to anticipate the most likely trajectories for global warming. What are the impacts of increased Arctic wildfires? As snow and ice in the Arctic disappear, how much solar heat will be absorbed versus reflected back into the atmosphere? What effects will that have on Arctic ecosystems? How well do we understand the relationship between melting ice sheets and global sea level rise? Could Arctic permafrost thaw one day release as much greenhouse gas as China or the United States emit now?1 If so, what does that mean for global carbon budgets?

Governments around the world are developing digital sovereignty strategies to reduce their dependence on foreign technology providers and reassert control over their digital infrastructures. In the European Union, this has resulted in a number of regulations – including the Digital Markets Act, the Data Act, the AI Act, and related initiatives – that aim to reduce Europe’s reliance on US cloud hyperscalers while developing domestic alternatives. This article asks how digital sovereignty rules shape states’ bargaining with tech giants and what these rules tell us about these firms’ infrastructural power. Theoretically, it proposes an updated version of the Obsolescing Bargaining Model (OBM) for digital infrastructures, which analyses whether there are analogies between the expansion of US oil companies in the 1970s and today’s bargaining between EU governments and US hyperscalers. Empirically, it traces the expansion of four hyperscalers – Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, Google Cloud, and Oracle Cloud – across Europe between 2018-2026, combining firm-level data on data centre investments with text-as-data analysis on earning calls and annual filings to capture how firms adapt and respond to increased regulatory pressure. Findings show that digital sovereignty rules have so far had limited impact on hyperscalers’ expansion. This is due to factors such as enduring power asymmetries between governments and US hyperscalers, a lack of coordination among governments themselves, and the intrinsic limits of regulatory instruments that discipline firm behaviour but do not govern market access. The article contributes to existing debates on the structural power of big tech companies, the geoeconomics of digital infrastructures, and the interaction of regulation and industrial policy to shape firm-government relations.

The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is upending our lives and the global economy in ways unimaginable until recently. While the overall impacts are still difficult to quantify, ramifications are sure to be felt for decades to come. Providing secure, reliable, and affordable resources for all without causing devastating environmental consequences is perhaps the greatest challenge of the 21st century. But the pandemic has significantly altered dynamics and changed priorities. How is this impacting the quest for sustainability?

In this paper we analyze these challenges by focusing on the plastic industry. There is no doubt that plastic has molded society in many ways that make our lives easier and safer, but it has also created a global environmental and sustainability crisis. In order to curb our addiction to plastic, the world had been waging a war against virgin plastic, but the pandemic has turned an enemy into a much-needed ally. How can we leverage the advantages of plastic without contributing to the world’s environmental crisis? This dilemma poses a significant challenge, but also opens an opportunity to address sustainability at a systemic level through circularity and the transition to low-carbon alternatives to petroleum-based plastics.

This paper focuses on liquid biofuels, especially corn-based ethanol, and the energy-water nexus. It examines the implications of potential land area expansion for increased biofuel production and on water supply availability. Given the potential expansion of the use of irrigation in crop production for biofuels, the associated water footprint can be challenging in some areas, depending on the assumptions and trends considered in the projections. On average, biofuels are among the most water-intensive energy products. Producing a gallon of conventional gasoline requires 3 to 7 gallons of water, whereas a gallon of corn ethanol requires from 11 gallons up to 160 gallons of water in extreme situations. Thus, these impacts vary according to the production system and region.

The paper analyses the synergies and trade-offs between emission reduction policies and sustainable development objectives. Specifically, it provides an ex-ante assessment that the impacts of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), submitted under the Paris Agreement, will have on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of poverty eradication (SDG1) and reduced income inequality (SDG10). By combining an empirical analysis with a modelling exercise, the paper estimates the future trends of poverty prevalence and inequality across countries in a reference scenario and under a climate mitigation policy with alternative revenue recycling schemes. Our results suggest that a full implementation of the emission reduction contributions, stated in the NDCs, is projected to slow down the effort to reduce poverty by 2030 (+2% of the population below the poverty line compared to the baseline scenario), especially in countries that have proposed relatively more stringent mitigation targets and suffer higher policy costs. Conversely, countries with a stringent mitigation policy experience a reduction of inequality compared to baseline scenario levels. If financial support for mitigation action in developing countries is provided through an international climate fund, the prevalence of poverty will be slightly reduced at the aggregate level (185,000 fewer poor people with respect to the mitigation scenario), but the country-specific effect depends on the relative size of funds flowing to beneficiary countries and on their economic structure.

Carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration (CCUS) is a set of technologies that capture carbon dioxide (CO₂) at point source and either store the CO₂ for permanent storage underground or utilize it in the economy such that carbon will not be released back into the atmosphere. Most national and international models indicate that CCUS will be needed, along with a range of other technologies, to economically reach net-zero emissions by 2050 in the United States. The scale of CO₂ capture via CCUS required to achieve net-zero in the United States is 0.9- 1.7 gigatons of CO₂ per year by 2050 in most pathways, according to estimates by Princeton University’s Net-Zero America Project.

This brief examines the national challenges related to deploying and scaling infrastructure to transport CO₂ from capture sites to storage or utilization sites at a scale consistent with achieving net-zero by 2050.

Pipelines will likely continue to be the predominant CO₂ transport mode in the future in the United States. Other modes of transport, such as shipping and trucking, are only economical under specific circumstances and are not as attractive as pipelines for the bulk of CO₂ transport needs under large-scale CCUS deployment.

To reach net-zero by 2050, the CO₂ pipeline network in the United States needs to expand far beyond its current five thousand miles and must evolve from the existing model where pipelines are built mostly to serve individual projects to a network model where projects share infrastructure and thereby exploit economies of scale.

A variety of current models appraise potential CO₂ pipeline networks at local, regional, and national levels. Like other types of models, these CO₂ pipeline models are not prescriptive. Instead, they provide illustrative exercises intended to help analysts and stakeholders understand the physical scale and cost implications of the CO₂ transport infrastructure required for net-zero, given current technology and assumptions on future technology advancement.

Here we compare the assumptions, methodologies, and cost estimates from two different CO₂ pipeline models, developed by the Great Plains Institute and the Net-Zero America Project at Princeton University, which fit the time and geographical boundaries of our research question. We also briefly discuss additional studies that focus on near-term potential for localized networks.

Based on the literature and interviews with policymakers, academics, and business executives, we propose the following policy priorities to support the development of CO₂ pipeline transport:

1. Expanding targeted incentives that address the economic viability of pipeline development, building on the momentum of the expanded 45Q tax credits in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022.
2. Deepening community engagement to address public sentiment around CO₂ pipelines.
3. Increasing federal-state and state-state collaborations on pipeline expansion planning.
4. Streamlining permitting processes across federal and state lands.

On 25 June 2021, a historic fisheries Agreement entered into force: The Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO). Nine countries and the European Union agreed to refrain from any commercial fishing in the CAO and to jointly undertake a scientific effort to understand ecosystem dynamics, including fish populations. This was the first multilateral Agreement to take a legally binding, precautionary approach to protect an area from commercial fishing before fishing had begun. The Agreement is a textbook example of the precautionary principle as it works to take “preventive action in the face of uncertainty.” However, despite the precautionary principle's popularity with natural resource academics, it is rare for countries to forego economic benefits and to adopt this approach in managing resources. So, what made this Agreement possible? And what can we learn from this Agreement that could provide guidance on other resource management challenges? This paper explores the unique conditions that made this Agreement possible and examines how success was achieved by the interrelationships of science, policy, legal structures, politics, stakeholder collaboration, and diplomacy. In summary, this paper concludes that a series of factors helped make this Agreement possible, including but not limited to: scientific breakthroughs coupled with science-based legal frameworks; proactive partnerships between industry, environmental non-profits, and government; willingness of international stakeholders to learn from prior mistakes; and a nation willing to be the first-mover in foregoing future economic profits within their own Exclusive Economic Zone to order to benefit ecosystems beyond their waters.

The Biden administration has established a national goal of 100% carbon-free electricity by 2035 and reaching net-zero economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. To realize these goals, the United States must not only transition the production of power, but also build thousands of miles of upgraded or new transmission. The U.S. electric grid consists of 600,000 miles of transmission lines connected to over 1 million megawatts of electricity generation capacity. Over 70% of these lines are more than 25 years old, well into their approximately 50-year lifetime. Furthermore, to meet President Biden’s 2050 goal, experts claim that over a million miles of new transmission will have to be built over a three-decade time span.

Most plausible pathways to net-zero emissions call for the electrification of multiple services, such as heating and transportation. The resulting increase in electricity demand will require major upgrades to the grid, with some studies suggesting a 60% increase in peak demand by 2050.

In the United States, the greatest potential wind energy resources are in the Midwest and along the two coasts, while the greatest solar energy resources are in the Southwest and in Florida. New transmission lines will be needed to carry the electricity from the areas where the renewable resources are most plentiful to distant load centers.

Integration of renewables is a challenge due to the intermittent nature of wind and solar power. Solutions to the intermittency problem include a combination of relying on clean backup power sources (hydroelectric facilities, hydrogen fuels, and, in the short term, natural gas), storage, and demand responses. The lower capacity factors for wind and solar generation mean that transmission dedicated to variable renewable power will also have lower utilization rates than transmission supporting firm power sources and higher costs per unit of power transported. Hence in the future, the costs of upgrading and expanding the grid may become a much higher percentage of the overall costs of the electric system.

If solar and wind systems are built at community scale through greater reliance on mini-grids, substantial investments in the grid will still be needed. The electric grid was designed for flows from the high voltage grid to the distribution system and then final customer loads. In a scenario in which electricity systems rely on distributive energy systems like roof-top solar collectors and many small generators, power flows need to be reversed. Local distribution systems will need to be upgraded with new infrastructure, such as smarter transformers, to manage and to monitor power flows in and out of the local distribution system in order to avoid overloads. Further reforms will be needed to give hundreds of grid operators the ability to monitor and manage the interaction between local suppliers and local loads while retaining voltage and frequency levels. Modeling studies of the economics of achieving a net-zero carbon emissions grid generally find that centralized wind and solar generation is significantly cheaper than the mini-grid option. This conclusion assumes that new transmission can be approved, sited and constructed in a reasonable time frame and that these lines will not have to be buried to satisfy local interests. If these assumptions prove wrong, community level grids may look more promising.

Recent studies have concluded that the efforts to create an emissions-free electricity sector will require a massive expansion of the electric grid in order to reach net-zero emissions by mid-century, with total transmission capacity increasing by 2-5 times from current levels and transmission investments totaling up to $2.4 trillion. There are multiple technical, economic, and public policy challenges to expanding the grid by this magnitude.

First, there is a lack of coordination between regional and national transmission planning. The organizations responsible for regional transmission planning are often legally constrained from prioritizing the reduction of carbon emissions. Furthermore, construction of new transmission requires an extensive siting and permitting process that can stretch for over a decade and may put the goal of a carbon-free electric grid by 2035 out of reach. The result is an economic-based chicken and egg problem, with transmission developers hesitant to build, not knowing whether the generators will provide the power to fill the new lines, and investors in new renewable generation are equally reluctant to invest when the availability of transmission to move their power is in doubt. We focus in this policy brief on the transmission challenges in an electricity system heavily reliant on intermittent renewables. If left unsolved, these obstacles could significantly raise the costs of a widespread expansion of utility scale renewable power.

Electric vehicles (EVs) have advanced significantly this decade, owing in part to decreasing battery costs. Yet EVs remain more costly than gasoline fueled vehicles over their useful life. This paper analyzes the additional advances that will be needed, if electric vehicles are to significantly penetrate the passenger vehicle fleet.

Climate change driven by anthropengic carbon emissions is one of the most serious challenges facing human development. China is currently the world’s largest developing country, primary energy consumer, and carbon emitter. The nation releases one quarter of the global total of carbon dioxide (9.2 Gt CO2 in 2013), 1.5 times that from the US. Nearly three-quarters (73%) of the growth in global carbon emission between 2010 and 2012 occurred in China. Without mitigation, China’s emissions could rise by more than 50% in the next 15 years. Given the magnitude and growth rate of China’s carbon emissions, the country has become a critical partner in developing policy approaches to reduce global CO2 emissions.

China is a country with significant regional differences in terms of technology, energy mix, and economic development. 1 Understanding the characteristics and state of regional carbon emissions within China is critical for designing geographically appropriate mitigation policies, including the provincial cap and trade system that is projected to be lanuched in 2017. In this study, I summarize the key features and drivers of China’s regional carbon emissions and conclude with suggestions for a low carbon policy for China.

China announced it would launch a national carbon market in 2017, yet this policy is taking years to come into effect. What will it take for a carbon market to work in command-and-control China? This policy brief explores an understudied challenge—emissions accounting—and identifies potential opportunities that have arisen in the first phase of China’s national carbon market.

President Xi Jinping’s pledge during the 2020 United Nations General Assembly, that China would reach peak carbon dioxide emissions by 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060, is a significant step in the fight against climate change. Since China is the world’s top contributor of greenhouse gases, there is no doubt that Beijing needs to be front and center of any effort to curb global emissions.

Policymakers guiding their economies to a low-carbon, prosperous future must strike the right balance between technology-push and demand-pull. The rapid build-out of solar photovoltaics (PV) in recent years has revealed the benefits of generous demand-pull policies, but also their limits. Here, we show why combining robust demand-pull and technology-push policies results in more effective policy mixes that go beyond innovation and deployment to help competitive domestic industries create more and better jobs.

Artificial intelligence—AI—is an information technology. It consists of software. It runs on computers. And it is already deeply embedded into our social fabric, both in ways we understand and in ways we don’t. It will hack our society to a degree and effect unlike anything that’s come before. I mean this in two very different ways. One, AI systems will be used to hack us. And two, AI systems will themselves become hackers: finding vulnerabilities in all sorts of social, economic, and political systems, and then exploiting them at an unprecedented speed, scale, and scope. It’s not just a difference in degree; it’s a difference in kind. We risk a future of AI systems hacking other AI systems, with humans being little more than collateral damage.

This isn’t hyperbole. Okay, maybe it’s a bit of hyperbole, but none of this requires far-future science-fiction technology. I’m not postulating any “singularity,” where the AI-learning feedback loop becomes so fast that it outstrips human understanding. I’m not assuming intelligent androids like Data (Star Trek), R2-D2 (Star Wars), or Marvin the Paranoid Android (The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy). My scenarios don’t require evil intent on the part of anyone. We don’t need malicious AI systems like Skynet (Terminator) or the Agents (Matrix). Some of the hacks I will discuss don’t even require major research breakthroughs. They’ll improve as AI techniques get more sophisticated, but we can see hints of them in operation today. This hacking will come naturally, as AIs become more advanced at learning, understanding, and problem-solving.

In this essay, I will talk about the implications of AI hackers. First, I will generalize “hacking” to include economic, social, and political systems—and also our brains. Next, I will describe how AI systems will be used to hack us. Then, I will explain how AIs will hack the economic, social, and political systems that comprise society. Finally, I will discuss the implications of a world of AI hackers, and point towards possible defenses. It’s not all as bleak as it might sound.

China and the United States together emit more than 40 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide (CO2) according to the latest available data.[1] Therefore any successful global effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions must include meaningful contributions from both countries. Each country has started down this path by committing to reduce CO2 emissions and both have announced plans, policies, and programs to meet those commitments. However, the character of the carbon problem in each country is different and so while the plans, programs, and policies they are pursuing have some similarities, the emphasis is different.

This report recommends policies and actions to improve the return on investment the U.S. government makes in sponsoring research and development (R&D) at the Department of Energy's (DOE) seventeen National Laboratories ("Labs"). While the Labs make a unique and significant contribution to all of the Department of Energy's missions, the authors develop the idea that for the Labs to fully support DOE's energy transformation goals, their R&D management practices need to be updated to better reflect current research into innovation systems and management. They also highlight the necessity of Lab interactions with industry in order to impact the nation's energy infrastructure investment, which is, for the most part, privately held.

Providing secure, reliable, affordable energy that is needed to fuel prosperity for all without causing devastating environmental consequences is perhaps the greatest challenge of the 21st century. Over the coming decades, global energy systems will need to transition from an era which relied on fossil fuels to one more dependent on clean energy. This transition will not simply consist of replacing one energy source with another. Rather, it will affect the systems, networks, and partnerships that embody the energy industry as we have known it for the last century. Many of these changes will be driven by technological innovation, which in turn will impact the nature and value of existing assets, supply chains, and regulatory and policy institutions. But innovation by itself is not the goal; the real objective is to deploy innovation at scale and bring the ensuing products and services to market in a secure, reliable, and affordable way.

Academia, business, governments, and civil society are all searching for innovative solutions to actively decarbonize all energy systems and sectors, and yet today’s pace of energy innovation is simply not fast enough to meet the challenge. Why is this not happening more rapidly? What needs to be done to speed up the innovation effort?

Success is possible, but it will require close coordination of policy, technology, capital, and society. Partnerships between the public and private sector will be central to this effort and must be complemented by the ability to educate all stakeholders on the challenges and opportunities inherent in the energy transition.

By focusing on real-world energy companies and eliciting the perspective of stakeholders, our goal is to uncover lessons learned from the private sector and recommend new paths to lead in the transition to a low-carbon economy. What steps is your company taking to adapt and change in response to the climate crisis? What is the role of the private sector in meeting or exceeding the Paris Agreement targets? Where are there opportunities for leadership? As part of the new Global Energy Technology Innovation (GETI) initiative at Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center we asked these and other questions of industry leaders around the world.

In the spring of 2020, I convened the inaugural student study group “Energy Innovation and the Transition to a Low-Carbon Economy: Advising Fortune 500 Companies.” This report, part one of a broader series of interactions with leaders in energy and innovation and Harvard students, dives into these issues through the lens of a multinational utility. We present the insights of ENGIE’s Executive VP Shankar Krishnamoorthy, who is leading the company’s strategy and innovation efforts, and provide the study group participants’ advice on how ENGIE could continue its low-carbon transition into the future.

The Tesla Semi is a battery powered electric long haul truck currently in the prototype phase. Since cost and technological barriers have prevented electric vehicles from making significant inroads into the market for long haul trucks, the announcement of the Tesla Semi marks one of the first major attempts to bring electrification to on-road long haul freight transport. China, as the world’s largest carbon emitter, is an important market for truck electrification. China has a bourgeoning passenger electric vehicle market but, like the rest of the world, is reliant on heavily polluting diesel trucks for on-road freight transport.

This paper addresses two main questions:

1. What are the potential impacts on carbon emissions of electric long haul trucks in China?
2. What are the barriers to the adoption of electric long haul trucks in China?

European countries are at a crossroads on their path to carbon neutrality. Today, they are at the forefront of the global clean hydrogen race but going forward they would be better served by collaborating instead of working alone.

Overall, the European Union (EU) is highly competitive in clean technologies manufacturing and thus well-positioned to benefit from the emergence of global hydrogen markets. But a narrow focus on short-term cost considerations could drive member states to implement national roadmaps with little or no coordination among themselves and hence little or no chance of competing globally.

As a bloc, the EU has pledged to reach carbon neutrality by 2050. Clean hydrogen is a cornerstone of this transformational effort; accordingly, in July 2020, the EU adopted its hydrogen strategy with the ambition of deploying open and competitive clean hydrogen markets for all energy sectors and segments by 2050.1

Success hinges around implementing a cohesive long-term strategy to address a fundamental ques- tion and its associated challenges: where could the EU source competitive and secure renewable hydrogen supplies?

As our previous research shows, all countries have access to renewable resources (such as solar or wind), to different degrees, and could produce some renewable hydrogen locally. However, while resource-rich countries, such as Spain, could evolve into regional exporters, no EU member state has the potential to become a global export champion. At the same time, North African countries, such as Morocco, are well-situated to act as key suppliers to the EU. Furthermore, imports from resource-rich regions like North America could help to address security of supply concerns.2

Today, EU hydrogen demand stands at 7.8 million tons per year (Mt/yr), equivalent to about 10% of global demand. Germany and the Netherlands are the largest consumers, accounting for over a third of EU demand, followed by Poland, Spain, Italy, Belgium, and France, which consume about 0.5 Mt/yr each.3 According to available projections, as hydrogen use grows across all economic sectors, EU hydrogen demand could reach 76 Mt/yr by 2050.

But while the EU strategy sets clear targets on electrolyzer deployment by 2030, it provides very few details on how the bloc could meet demand—and at what cost—by 2050.