Person:

Garcia, Fernando

This report aims to answer the critical but difficult question: "What will it take for Jordan to grow?" Though Jordan has numerous active growth and reform strategies in place, they do not clearly answer this fundamental question. The Jordanian economy has experienced more than a decade of slow growth. Per capita income today is lower than it was prior to the Global Financial Crisis as Jordan has experienced a refugee-driven population increase. Jordan’s comparative advantages have narrowed over time as external shocks and responses to these shocks have changed the productive structure of Jordan’s economy. This was a problem well before the country faced the COVID-19 pandemic. The Jordanian economy has lost productivity, market access, and, critically, the ability to afford high levels of imports as a share of GDP. Significant efforts toward fiscal consolidation have further constrained aggregate demand, which has slowed non-tradable activity and the ability of the economy to create jobs. Labor market outcomes have worsened over time and are especially bad for women and youth. Looking ahead, this report identifies clear and significant opportunities for Jordan to strengthen new engines of export growth that would enable better overall job creation and resilience, even amidst the continued unpredictability of the pandemic. This report argues that there is need for a paradigm shift in Jordan’s growth strategy to focus more direct attention and resources on activating “agents of change” to accelerate the emergence of key growth opportunities, and that there are novel roles that donor countries can play in support of this.

This publication synthesizes the main findings and recommendations from a series of reports on Bolivia’s Economic Pivot. We examine the origins of the current crisis and propose a strategy to restore macroeconomic stability while supporting long-term growth. Bolivia’s macroeconomic collapse is the most visible symptom of a much deeper crisis. While the contraction of natural gas production was a key trigger, the country’s crisis stems from a broader institutional breakdown that weakened private investment, export capacity, and productivity growth across the economy. In response, we outline a comprehensive reform plan based on 5 pillars: 1) a growth-enhancing and credible fiscal consolidation; 2) an effective and targeted social compensation network; 3) a restoration of external balance and monetary credibility; 4) renewed investment attractiveness and restored export potential in strategic sectors; and 5) a new institutional foundation for developing new productive capabilities.

This paper asks whether the World Bank can change the denomination of its lending without weakening its own financial position. Using monthly CPI and exchange-rate data, we construct the dollar returns the Bank would earn on loans indexed to borrowers’ domestic inflation and aggregate those returns using current IBRD and IDA portfolio weights. Country returns are volatile. Portfolio returns are much calmer because cross-country correlations are low. The diversification dividend is large enough to make the financially indifferent coupon on a CPI-indexed instrument close to, and in some cases below, current lending rates. The World Bank can reduce one of the core sources of macroeconomic instability in borrowing countries at little or no financial cost to itself.

This paper assesses Bolivia’s macroeconomic stabilization prospects through a macro-financial scenario framework, comparing three distinct trajectories: a counterfactual absent any reforms, the path under reforms implemented or announced to date (April 2026), and one that assumes a select set of additional reforms. Bolivia’s crisis, rooted in the absence of fiscal adjustment after the collapse of natural gas revenues, ranks among the most challenging in this century. Absent any reform, Bolivia was on the verge of a collapse, including a sharp contraction of imports, deep recession, runaway monetary financing, accelerating inflation, and a high probability of external default. The new government’s initial measures have reduced immediate risks. However, the initial reform package remains insufficient for full stabilization. The paper describes a feasible set of additional reforms to achieve stabilization and growth. An expansionary fiscal consolidation is still possible if reforms are carried out following a specific set of conditions, given Bolivia’s current economic constraints. Stabilization and growth are achievable, but the window of opportunity will narrow if critical reforms are delayed.

Bolivia’s macroeconomic crisis was long in the making. A temporary commodity windfall and a gas export engine built in the 1990s delivered a decade of growth, rising fiscal revenues, and an unprecedented buildup of foreign assets. But instead of using that window to build new sources of tradable income and productive capacity, the country adopted policies that gradually weakened the very gas sector on which the model depended. As gas production and hydrocarbon revenues fell, the state chose to preserve spending and the fixed exchange rate. The result was a sequence of increasingly costly stopgaps: first the depletion of international reserves, then the collapse of the peg, the rise of the inflation tax, and financial repression. In the process, households saw the real value of their savings eroded through the pension system and bank deposits. This paper shows how that strategy delayed adjustment for nearly a decade while making the eventual crisis more severe. Using counterfactual benchmarks for output and the real exchange rate, it quantifies the cost of delay and the scale of the distortions that any stabilization program must now unwind.