Person:

Schacter, Daniel

This article considers methodological issues arising from recent efforts to provide field tests of eyewitness identification procedures. We focus in particular on a field study (Mecklenburg 2006) that examined the “double blind, sequential” technique, and consider the implications of an acknowledged methodological confound in the study. We explain why the confound has severe consequences for assessing the real-world implications of this study.

Everyday contextual settings create associations that later afford generating predictions about what objects to expect in our environment. The cortical network that takes advantage of such contextual information is proposed to connect the representation of associated objects such that seeing one object (bed) will activate the visual representations of other objects sharing the same context (pillow). Given this proposal, we hypothesized that the cortical activity elicited by seeing a strong contextual object would predict the occurrence of false memories whereby one erroneously "remembers'' having seen a new object that is related to a previously presented object. To test this hypothesis, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging during encoding of contextually related objects, and later tested recognition memory. New objects that were contextually related to previously presented objects were more often falsely judged as "old'' compared with new objects that were contextually unrelated to old objects. This phenomenon was reflected by activity in the cortical network mediating contextual processing, which provides a better understanding of how the brain represents and processes context.

Young and older adults are more likely to remember emotional information than neutral information. The present functional magnetic resonance imaging study examined the neural processes supporting young (ages 18-35) and older (ages 62-79) adults' successful encoding of positive, negative, and neutral objects (e.g., a sundae, a grenade, a canoe). The results revealed general preservation of the emotional memory network across the age groups. Both groups recruited the amygdala and the orbito-frontal cortex during the successful encoding of positive and negative information. Both ages also showed valence-specific recruitment: right fusiform activity was greatest during the successful encoding of negative information, whereas left prefrontal and temporal activity was greatest during the successful encoding of positive information. These valence-specific processes are consistent with behavioral evidence that negative information is processed with perceptual detail, whereas positive information is processed at a conceptual or schematic level. The only age differences in emotional memory emerged during the successful encoding of positive items: Older adults showed more activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and along the cingulate gyrus than young adults. Because these regions often are associated with self-referential processing, these results suggest that older adults' mnemonic boost for positive information may stem from an increased tendency to process this information in relation to themselves.

We investigated the influence of distinctive encoding on the Jacoby and Whitehouse (1989) illusion. Subjects studied visually presented words that were associated with either an auditory presentation of the same word (non-distinctive encoding) or a picture of the object (distinctive encoding). In both conditions, words were visually presented on the recognition test, and half were preceded by brief repetition primes. Priming test items increased hits and false alarms in the auditory condition, demonstrating the Jacoby-Whitehouse illusion. This illusion was reduced in the picture condition. In order to test whether this distinctiveness effect was caused by a recollection-based response strategy (i.e., the distinctiveness heuristic), we minimized recollection-based responding by having subjects make speeded recognition decisions. Contrary to the distinctiveness heuristic hypothesis, speeded responding did not eliminate the distinctiveness effect on the Jacoby-Whitehouse illusion. Picture encoding may reduce this illusion via a shift in preretrieval orientation, as opposed to a postretrieval editing process.

Source memory research suggests that attempting to remember specific contextual aspects surrounding prior stimulus encounters results in greater left prefrontal cortex (PFC) activity than simple item-based old/new recognition judgments. Here, we tested a complementary hypothesis that predicts increases in the right PFC with tasks requiring close monitoring of item familiarity. More specifically, we compared a judgment of frequency (JOF) task to an item memory task, in which the former required estimating the number of previous picture encounters and the latter required discriminating old from new exemplars of previously seen items. In comparison to standard old/new recognition, both source memory and the JOF task examined here require more precise mnemonic judgments. However, in contrast to source memory, cognitive models suggest the JOF task relies heavily upon item familiarity, not specific contextual recollections. Event-related fMRI demonstrated greater recruitment of right, not left, dorso-lateral and frontopolar PFC regions during the JOF compared to item memory task. These data suggest a role for right PFC in the close monitoring of the familiarity of objects, which becomes critical when contextual recollection is ineffective in satisfying a memory demand.

People often falsely recognize nonstudied lures that are semantically similar to previously studied words. Behavioral research suggests that such false recognition is based on high semantic overlap between studied items and lures that yield a feeling of familiarity, whereas true recognition is more often associated with the recollection of details. Despite this behavioral evidence for differences between true and false recognition, research measuring brain activity (PET, fMRI, ERP) has not clearly differentiated corresponding differences in brain activity. A median split was used to separate subjects into Good and Poor performers based on their discrimination of studied targets from similar lures. Only Good performers showed late (1000-1500 msec), right frontal event-related brain potentials (ERPs) that were more positive for targets and lures compared with new items. The right frontal differences are interpreted as reflecting postretrieval evaluation processes that were more likely to be engaged by Good than Poor performers. Both Good and Poor performers showed a parietal ERP old/new effect (400-800 msec), but only Poor performers showed a parietal old/lure difference. These results are consistent with the view that the parietal and frontal ERP old/new effects reflect dissociable processes related to recollection.

According to the distinctiveness heuristic, subjects rely more on detailed recollections (and less on familiarity) when memory is tested for pictures relative to words, leading to reduced false recognition. If so, then neural regions that have been implicated in effortful postretrieval monitoring (e.g., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) might be recruited less heavily when trying to remember pictures. We tested this prediction with the criterial recollection task. Subjects studied black words, paired with either the same word in red font or a corresponding colored picture. Red words were repeated at study to equate recognition hits for red words and pictures. During fMRI scanning, alternating red word memory tests and picture memory tests were given, using only white words as test stimuli (say “yes” only if you recollect a corresponding red word or picture, respectively). These tests were designed so that subjects had to rely on memory for the criterial information. Replicating prior behavioral work, we found enhanced rejection of lures on the picture test compared to the red word test, indicating that subjects had used a distinctiveness heuristic. Critically, dorsolateral prefrontal activity was reduced when rejecting familiar lures on the picture test, relative to the red word test. These findings indicate that reducing false recognition via the distinctiveness heuristic is not heavily dependent on frontally mediated postretrieval monitoring processes.

Metamemory refers to knowledge and monitoring of one's own memory. Metamemory monitoring can be done prospectively with respect to subsequent memory retrieval or retrospectively with respect to previous memory retrieval. In this study, we used fMRI to compare neural activity during prospective feeling-of-knowing and retrospective confidence tasks in order to examine common and distinct mechanisms supporting multiple forms of metamemory monitoring. Both metamemory tasks, compared to non-metamemory tasks, were associated with greater activity in medial prefrontal, medial parietal, and lateral parietal regions, which have previously been implicated in internally directed cognition. Furthermore, compared to non-metamemory tasks, metamemory tasks were associated with less activity in occipital regions, and in lateral inferior frontal and dorsal medial prefrontal regions, which have previously shown involvement in visual processing and stimulus-oriented attention, respectively. Thus, neural activity related to metamemory is characterized by both a shift toward internally directed cognition and away from externally directed cognition. Several regions demonstrated differences in neural activity between feeling-of-knowing and confidence tasks, including fusiform, medial temporal lobe, and medial parietal regions; furthermore, these regions also showed interaction effects between task and the subjective metamemory rating, suggesting that they are sensitive to the information monitored in each particular task. These findings demonstrate both common and distinct neural mechanisms supporting metamemory processes and also serve to elucidate the functional roles of previously characterized brain networks.

Event-related potentials (ERPs) were used to investigate the neural processes underlying the distinctiveness heuristic— a response mode in which participants expect to remember vivid details of an experience and make recognition decisions based on this metacognitive expectation. One group of participants studied pictures and auditory words; another group studied visual and auditory words. Studied and novel items were presented at test as words only, with all novel items repeating after varying lags. ERP differences were seen between the word and picture groups for both studied and novel items. For the novel items, ERP differences were largest in frontal and central midline electrodes. In separate analyses, the picture group showed the greatest ERP differences between item types in a parietally based component from 550 to 1000 msec, whereas the word group showed the greatest differences in a frontally based component from 1000 to 2000 msec. The authors suggest that the distinctiveness heuristic is a retrieval orientation that facilitates reliance upon recollection to differentiate between item types. Although the picture group can use this heuristic and its retrieval orientation on the basis of recollection, the word group must engage additional postretrieval processes to distinguish between item types, reflecting the use of a different retrieval orientation.

Although several studies have examined the neural basis for age-related changes in objective memory performance, less is known about how the process of memory monitoring changes with aging. The authors used functional magnetic resonance imaging to examine retrospective confidence in memory performance in aging. During low confidence, both younger and older adults showed behavioral evidence that they were guessing during recognition and that they were aware they were guessing when making confidence judgments. Similarly, both younger and older adults showed increased neural activity during low- compared to high-confidence responses in the lateral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and left intraparietal sulcus. In contrast, older adults showed more high-confidence errors than younger adults. Younger adults showed greater activity for high compared to low confidence in medial temporal lobe structures, but older adults did not show this pattern. Taken together, these findings may suggest that impairments in the confidence-accuracy relationship for memory in older adults, which are often driven by high-confidence errors, may be primarily related to altered neural signals associated with greater activity for high-confidence responses.