Person:

Somerville, Leah

There is a significant inflection in risk taking and criminal behavior during adolescence, but the basis for this increase remains largely unknown. An increased sensitivity to rewards has been suggested to explain these behaviors, yet juvenile offences often occur in emotionally charged situations of negative valence. How behavior is altered by changes in negative emotional processes during adolescence has received less attention than changes in positive emotional processes. The current study uses a measure of impulsivity in combination with cues that signal threat or safety to assess developmental changes in emotional responses to threat cues. We show that adolescents, especially males, impulsively react to threat cues relative to neutral ones more than adults or children, even when instructed not to respond. This adolescent-specific behavioral pattern is paralleled by enhanced activity in limbic cortical regions implicated in the detection and assignment of emotional value to inputs and in the subsequent regulation of responses to them when successfully suppressing impulsive responses to threat cues. In contrast, prefrontal control regions implicated in detecting and resolving competing responses show an adolescent-emergent pattern (i.e. greater activity in adolescents and adults relative to children) during successful suppression of a response regardless of emotion. Our findings suggest that adolescence is a period of heightened sensitivity to social and emotional cues that results in diminished regulation of behavior in their presence.

Humans are sophisticated social beings. Social cues from others are exceptionally salient, particularly during adolescence. Understanding how adolescents interpret and learn from variable social signals can provide insight into the observed shift in social sensitivity during this period. The current study tested 120 participants between the ages of 8 and 25 years on a social reinforcement learning task where the probability of receiving positive social feedback was parametrically manipulated. Seventy-eight of these participants completed the task during fMRI scanning. Modeling trial-by-trial learning, children and adults showed higher positive learning rates than adolescents, suggesting that adolescents demonstrated less differentiation in their reaction times for peers who provided more positive feedback. Forming expectations about receiving positive social reinforcement correlated with neural activity within the medial prefrontal cortex and ventral striatum across age. Adolescents, unlike children and adults, showed greater insular activity during positive prediction error learning and increased activity in the supplementary motor cortex and the putamen when receiving positive social feedback regardless of the expected outcome, suggesting that peer approval may motivate adolescents towards action. While different amounts of positive social reinforcement enhanced learning in children and adults, all positive social reinforcement equally motivated adolescents. Together, these findings indicate that sensitivity to peer approval during adolescence goes beyond simple reinforcement theory accounts and suggests possible explanations for how peers may motivate adolescent behavior.

In the present study, we examined the relationship between developmental modulation of socioaffective brain systems and adolescents’ preoccupation with social evaluation. Child, adolescent, and adult participants viewed cues indicating that a camera was alternately off, warming up, or projecting their image to a peer during the acquisition of behavioral-, autonomic-, and neural-response (functional MRI) data. Believing that a peer was actively watching them was sufficient to induce self-conscious emotion that rose in magnitude from childhood to adolescence and partially subsided into adulthood. Autonomic arousal was uniquely heightened in adolescents. These behavioral patterns were paralleled by emergent engagement of the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and striatum-MPFC connectivity during adolescence, which are thought to promote motivated social behavior in adolescence. These findings demonstrate that adolescents’ self-consciousness is related to age-dependent sensitivity of brain systems critical to socioaffective processes. Further, unique interactions between the MPFC and striatum may provide a mechanism by which social-evaluation contexts influence adolescent behavior.

Anxious emotion can manifest on brief (threat response) and/or persistent (chronic apprehension and arousal) timescales, and prior work has suggested that these signals are supported by separable neural circuitries. This fMRI study utilized a mixed block-event–related emotional provocation paradigm in 55 healthy participants to simultaneously measure brief and persistent anxious emotional responses, testing the specificity of, and interactions between, these potentially distinct systems. Results indicated that components of emotional processing networks were uniquely sensitive to transient and sustained anxious emotion. Whereas the amygdala and midbrain showed only transient responses, the ventral basal forebrain and anterior insula showed sustained activity during extended emotional contexts that tracked positively with task-evoked anxiety. States of lesser anxiety were associated with greater sustained activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Furthermore, ventromedial prefrontal recruitment was lower in individuals with higher scores on intolerance of uncertainty measures, and this hyporecruitment predicted greater transient amygdala responding to potential threat cues. This work demonstrates how brain circuitries interact across temporal scales to support brief and persistent anxious emotion and suggests potentially divergent mechanisms of dysregulation in clinical syndromes marked by brief versus persistent symptoms of anxiety.

Adolescent decision-making has been described as impulsive and suboptimal in the presence of incentives. In this study we examined the neural substrates of adolescent decision-making using a perceptual discrimination task for which small and large rewards were associated with correctly detecting the direction of motion of a cloud of moving dots. Adults showed a reward bias of faster reaction times on trials for which the direction of motion was associated with a large reward. Adolescents, in contrast, were slower to make decisions on trials associated with large rewards. This behavioral pattern in adolescents was paralleled by greater recruitment of fronto-parietal regions important in representing the accumulation of evidence sufficient for selecting one choice over its alternative and the certainty of that choice. The findings suggest that when large incentives are dependent on performance, adolescents may require more evidence to accumulate prior to responding, to be certain to maximize their gains. Adults, in contrast, appear to be quicker in evaluating the evidence for a decision when primed by rewards. Overall these findings suggest that rather than reacting hastily, adolescents can be incentivized to take more time to make decisions when large rewards are at stake.

Recent years have seen a rejuvenation of interest in studies of motivation–cognition interactions arising from many different areas of psychology and neuroscience. The present issue of Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience provides a sampling of some of the latest research from a number of these different areas. In this introductory article, we provide an overview of the current state of the field, in terms of key research developments and candidate neural mechanisms receiving focused investigation as potential sources of motivation–cognition interaction. However, our primary goal is conceptual: to highlight the distinct perspectives taken by different research areas, in terms of how motivation is defined, the relevant dimensions and dissociations that are emphasized, and the theoretical questions being targeted. Together, these distinctions present both challenges and opportunities for efforts aiming toward a more unified and cross-disciplinary approach. We identify a set of pressing research questions calling for this sort of cross-disciplinary approach, with the explicit goal of encouraging integrative and collaborative investigations directed toward them.

When pursuing high-value goals, mature individuals typically titrate cognitive performance according to environmental demands. However, it remains unclear whether adolescents similarly integrate value-based goals to selectively enhance goal-directed behavior. We used a value-contingent cognitive control task during fMRI to assess how stakes—the value of a prospective outcome—modulate flexible goal-directed behavior and underlying neurocognitive processes. Here we demonstrate that while adults enhance performance during high stakes, adolescents perform similarly during low and high stakes conditions. The developmental emergence of value-contingent performance is mediated by connectivity between the striatum and prefrontal cortex; this connectivity selectively increases during high stakes and with age. These findings suggest that adolescents may not benefit from high stakes to the same degree adults do—a behavioral profile that may be constrained by ongoing maturation of corticostriatal connectivity. We propose that late development of corticostriatal connectivity sets the stage for optimal goal-directed behavior.

Adolescence has been characterized as a developmental period of heightened reward seeking and attenuated aversive processing. However, it remains unclear how the neural bases of distinct outcome valuation processes shift during this stage of the lifespan. N = 74 participants ranging in age from 13 to 20 completed a value-modulated fMRI task in which participants earn low and high magnitude monetary outcomes to test whether gain and loss magnitude tracking- the neural representation of relative value in context- change differentially over this age span. Results revealed that gain and loss magnitude tracking follow asymmetric developmental trajectories. Gain magnitude tracking is elevated in in the striatum during early adolescence and then decreases with age. By contrast, loss magnitude tracking in the anterior insula follows a quadratic pattern, undergoing a temporary attenuation during mid-late adolescence. A typical comparison of gain versus loss outcomes (collapsing over magnitude effects) showed robust activity across a suite of brain regions sensitive to value based on prior work including the ventral striatum, but they exhibited no changes with age. These findings suggest that value coding subprocesses follow divergent developmental paths across adolescence, which may contribute to normative shifts in adolescent motivated behavior.

How do people represent their own and others’ emotional experiences? Contemporary emotion theories and growing evidence suggest that the conceptual representation of emotion plays a central role in how people understand the emotions both they and other people feel.1–6 Although decades of research indicate that adults typically represent emotion concepts as multidimensional, with valence (positive—negative) and arousal (activating—deactivating) as two primary dimensions,7–10 little is known about how this bidimensional (or circumplex) representation arises.11 Here we show that emotion representations develop from a monodimensional focus on valence to a bidimensional focus on both valence and arousal from age 6 to age 25. We investigated potential mechanisms underlying this effect and found that increasing verbal knowledge mediated emotion representation development over and above three other potential mediators: (i) fluid reasoning, (ii) the general ability to represent non-emotional stimuli bidimensionally, and (iii) task-related behaviors (e.g., using extreme ends of rating scales). These results suggest that verbal development facilitates the expansion of emotion concept representations (and potentially emotional experiences) from a “positive or negative” dichotomy in childhood to a multidimensional organization in adulthood.

Adolescents routinely take risks that impact the well-being of the friends they are with. However, it remains unclear when and how consequences for friends factor into decisions to take risks. Here we used an economic decision-making task to test whether risky choices are guided by the positive and negative consequences they promise for peers. Across a large developmental sample of participants ages 12-25, we show that risky decision computations increasingly assimilate friends' outcomes throughout adolescence into early adulthood in an asymmetric manner that overemphasizes protecting friends from incurring loss. Whereas adults accommodated friend outcomes to a greater degree when the friend was present and witnessing these choices, adolescents did so regardless of whether a friend could witness their decisions, highlighting the fundamentality of adolescent social motivations. By demonstrating that outcomes for another individual can powerfully tune an actor's risk tolerance, these results identify a key factor underlying peer-related motivations for risky behavior, with implications for the law and risk-prevention.