HDS Scholarly Articles

Unitarian Universalism has a proud history of socially responsible investing, and the inclusion of “generosity,” “equity,” and “justice” in the 2024 Statement of Shared Values reinforces a widespread consensus that Unitarian Universalist faith has much to do with the financial choices of Unitarian Universalists, as individuals, families, congregations, and association. Yet that consensus does not always translate into agreement about specific financial decisions, and the time is ripe for a more open-ended conversation about the best pathway from our shared values to concrete choices about wealth management. There are at least four distinct investment philosophies that Unitarian Universalists of good will might reasonably derive from our shared values. This essay describes each philosophy in some detail, then offers reflections about reparations that cut across the four philosophies.

The Sanskrit word dharma can be understood variously, but it mainly pertains to that which sustains one’s connection with one’s eternal nature. This is the gist of Bhaktivinoda Ṭhākura’s book Jaiva Dharma. To talk about one’s eternal nature implies that one also has a temporary nature. In his book, Bhativinoda attempts to explain, by its very title, the dharma of a living entity, the jīva. In other words, it attempts to explain what is that of the jīva that sustains its connection with its eternal nature. A Jīva is a living entity suitable to live across both spiritual and material realms. It can have both a noumenal and a phenomenal nature.

“Is Zoroastrianism Dualist or Monotheistic?” is an article in which Boyd and Crosby present two dualist and four monotheist responses to that question. The authors submit these six versions to philosophical scrutiny according to the way they manage the problem of evil. Ultimately, the authors opt for a seventh response – their response, which they find more plausible than the previous six other options and meets their criterion of philosophical scrutiny to a better extent. In this paper, I will present the seven versions the authors describe and ask which one responds better to Epicurus’ formulation of the abovementioned problem of evil. I am subjecting the seven versions to Epicurus’ formulation because it is formulated as questions that demand answers. Thus, Epicurus’ formulation provokes an active engagement with its questions. I argue that although Boyd and Crosby’s version does have a philosophical advantage over the others, it cannot guarantee the salvation of humankind given that their view makes it possible to think of the world as an increasingly better place, which humankind might not want to let go of altogether.

One of the central problems in Anne Conway’s metaphysical philosophy is answering the question: what is the identity and nature of the creature than endures through time? There are two basic ways of interpreting Conway’s answer to this question. One interpretation is that the identity is that of a soul, and its nature is material. This is the interpretation taken by Emily Thomas. Another interpretation is that a created spirit is the identity, and its nature is also material. This is the interpretation taken by Rozemond and Simmons. In this paper, I present an interpretation that is a version of Thomas’ thesis. It claims that the identity of Conway’s creature that endures through time is the soul. However, my interpretation goes beyond Thomas’ thesis and against Rozemond and Simmons in that the nature of the soul cannot be strictly material, thus possibly immaterial. This thesis relies on what I call “the contrary thesis,” as applied to Conway’s metaphysical philosophy.